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1 Introduction
Political scientists have long pondered over the conflict between capitalistic and democratic
principles. The former, as Iverson (2006) argues, “produces stark inequalities in the distrib-
ution of property and income, while the latter divides power in a manner that is in principle
egalitarian (one person, one vote).” This power distribution has been characterized as rule of
the poor, suggesting democracy is a regime that is most favorable to the many who are poor
(the “99%”) unlike aristocracy and oligarchy which privilege the rich few. How so? Democ-
racy gives people voting power to take other people’s money and to redistribute wealth.
The underlying logic is as follows: “if majority rule and universal suﬀrage were introduced
into a society marked by massive inequality, then most voters, being relatively poor, would
inevitably favor taxing the rich and transferring the proceeds downward.” (Shapiro, 2002).
To most political scientists, “it is nearly axiomatic that democracy serves as a mechanism
for redistribution.” (Gerring et. al. 2012)1 In this paper, we argue, even if this is true, i.e.,
the poor in a democracy do in fact vote to tax the rich and redistribute downward, they may
not end up richer after all.
We make this point within the context of the Meltzer-Richard model (Meltzer and
Richard, 1981), arguably the point of departure for the literature formalizing the size of
government and the amount of redistribution that emerges in a democracy. Using one
1To Plato and Aristotle, to James Madison and John Adams, and to numerous conservative commentators
thereafter, the inevitability of a “soak the rich” agenda of poor voters represents a major flaw in democracy.
The Economist (2012) suggests John Adams “worried that rule by the masses would lead to heavy taxes on
the rich in the name of equality. As a consequence, “the idle, the vicious, the intemperate would rush into
the utmost extravagance of debauchery, sell and spend all their share, and then demand a new division of
those who purchased from them.””
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simple variable — income inequality — the Meltzer-Richard model provides parsimonious pre-
dictions about citizens’ preferences for income redistribution in democracies. It relies on a
intuitively simple idea: since the median voter — the all-important voter in a democracy
with universal suﬀrage and majority rule — tends to have below-average income (assuming a
commonly-observed right-skewed distribution of pre tax income), she has a personal interest
in supporting income redistribution. We ask, what is the exact basis for her support? Is it
simply her desire to get richer?
The vast popularity of the Meltzer-Richard model, as noted, is due to its elegance and
sharp prediction.2 In the model (or, in the slight reformulation presented in Persson and
Tabellini, 2002a,b), voters diﬀer in one fundamental dimension, their innate productivity
or “eﬀective time”. Anticipating labor-leisure reactions, they vote on a pure, income-
redistributive program that pays the same lump-sum transfer to each voter financed by
a distorting, linear, labor-income tax. Under direct democracy with universal suﬀrage and
majority rule, the voter with median productivity is decisive; her preferences dictate what
gets elected and implemented. If the median voter has lower-than-average productivity, a
proportional tax on labor used to finance the lump-sum subsidy implies a net income transfer
to this voter. The larger the gap between the median and mean productivities, the higher
the tax rate, and hence, the larger the scale of redistributive income transfers (from rich to
2A Google search provides over 1800 citations for Meltzer and Richard (1981). Recent contributions
address numerous issues impinging on (and impinged by) redistributive politics, including, among many
others, tax avoidance (Traxler (2012)), social identity (Lindqvist and Östling (2013), Lupu and Pontusson
(2011)), fairness (Alesina and Angeletos (2005)), distributional conflict (Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)),
sociology (Kenworthy, 2007), and preference heterogeneity (Hodler (2008)). Other related studies emphasize
the dynamic aspects of redistribution (see for example, Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999), Azzimonti et. al.
(2006, 2008)). Beramendi and Anderson (2008) contains useful discussion and summaries of this literature.
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poor voters) favored by the median voter.3 She is, however, constrained in the amount of
redistribution she can direct her way — there are limits to how much the rich can be soaked
— by the reduction in the size of the pie available for redistribution as tax rates increase.
The central idea that emerges from this framework is that democracies with the highest
levels of inequality should see the greatest push for redistribution, because in such societies,
the median voter stands to gain from taxes that redistribute income.4 But gain how? The
literature appears silent on this question. Indeed, a casual reading of Meltzer and Richard
(1981) and the subsequent literature evokes a nearly axiomatic sense the answer is income:
what impels the impoverished median voter to support large-scale income redistribution
has to be the prospect of receiving higher income post redistribution. In this paper, we
demonstrate such a perception, seemingly true and obvious to us until we found otherwise,
is not fully correct: in fact, counterexamples to this perception abound. For standard, C.E.S.
preferences we derive simple conditions on the elasticity parameter for which the median voter
elects a tax-transfer policy that leaves her poorer in income terms. And it’s not just her.5
3A focus of much of the literature relates to empirical testing of a basic tenet of the Meltzer-Richard
model: the size of government, as measured by the scale of publicly-funded income redistribution, is directly
related to the level of income inequality in an economy (Meltzer and Richard (1983), Borge and Rattsø
(2004), Pontusson and Rueda, (2010), and Georgiadis and Manning (2012), to name a few).
4Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) find persuasive evidence favoring the Meltzer-Richard model show-
ing “countries that have experienced greater increases in market inequality also exhibit larger increases in
redistribution”.
5The possibility that redistribution can impoverish the median voter (and others) in income terms seems
to have been generally overlooked. An exception is Mulligan (2001). Using a variation of the Meltzer-Richard
model which allows some tax proceeds to be used for non-redistributive purposes, he contends the median
voter will be worse oﬀ with redistribution than they would be with no such program in place. This result,
he points out,
“..has important implications for political-economic theories of redistribution, because it implies that the
fully informed median voter cannot be expected to support programs of cash redistribution from rich to poor
— such as the negative income tax — merely on the basis of his personal benefits from the program.”
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Curiously, it is possible, despite receiving a positive net transfer, no agent emerges with more
income post transfer than they would in the absence of democracy-induced redistribution.
At the heart of our result are two insights, the crowding-out of a person’s labor income
following an increase in transfer income, and the notion that no leisure is sacrificed when $1
of labor income is replaced by $1 of transfer income. If the crowding-out is severe enough,
the intended beneficiaries of the income redistribution program may find themselves poorer
but happier from the leisure gained from a (possibly incomplete) swap of labor income with
transfer income.6
The overall implication is striking: the basis for income-redistributive policies in a democ-
racy, ironically, may not be income. This is not to suggest that, in theMeltzer-Richard model,
redistribution does not achieve its primary objective: evening out disparities in income. All
it means is that democracy-induced redistribution may not lead most to receive more income
than they would in its absence.
2 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
The model follows the classic Meltzer and Richard (1981) framework, or, more precisely,
its slight reformulation found in Persson and Tabellini (2002, Chapt. 6). This is a single-
good, static economy with a continuum of agents — denoted by  — who are distinguished
by their endowment of “eﬀective time”,  over and above the one unit of time available to
In our case, voters benefit from redistribution, though not necessarily by the way of greater income.
6The argument is fleshed out clearly in Section 2.2 below.
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all. Assume  is distributed according to a distribution G with support £ ¤  mean ¯ and
median   ¯, i.e., G is right or positive-skewed.7 G captures the fundamental inequality
in this economy.
Agents work and consume, and vote on a general redistributive policy, one that levies
a payroll tax on everyone and rebates the revenue, in a lump-sum manner, equally to all
agents. Let  denote agent ’s labor supply and  her leisure. Then, agent ’s time constraint
is given by 1 +  =  +  Those with higher  — sometimes referred to as “richer agents”
— have more eﬀective time to devote to work and play.
Let  ( ) denote the utility of agent , where  is consumption. Assume  ( ) ≡
 ()+ () where  and  , the same for all , are strictly increasing and strictly concave.
The budget constraint facing agent  is given by
 = (1− )  +  (1)
where  ∈ [0 1] is a payroll tax,  is the common lump-sum transfer, and the wage rate is
assumed to be 1. Notice in this setup, consumption and income are really the same thing.
Furthermore, note  is collected from only those who supply positive amounts of labor (and
hence, earn positive amounts of labor income).
Agent  chooses  ∈ [0 1 + ) to maximize   subject to (1) and the time constraint,
taking  and  as given. The first-order condition for an interior solution is given by
(1− ) ¡(1− )  ¡   ¢+ ¢ ≡ (1 +  −  ¡   ¢) (2)
It is easily checked that the second-order conditions to this problem are satisfied. Given
 (   )  leisure is then defined by,  (   ) ≡ 1+ −  (   )  It is straightforward to
7In the numerical example below, we allow for  in [0∞] 
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verify
( )
  0 and (
 )
  0, that is, richer agents supply more labor while higher
transfers reduces labor supply for each agent. Also
( )
  0 holds if the substitution
eﬀect of a tax increase dominates (weakly) the income eﬀect; consequently, the labor supply
(leisure) for each individual under a redistributive policy will be lower (higher) than in its
absence, or  (   )   ( 0 0) and  (   )   ( 0 0) 
The tax base is given by L ≡ R  (   ) G () where  (   ) ≥ 0 The government
budget constraint is given by  = L It is easy to verify that L  0 implying an increase
in the tax rate always reduces the tax base. This is the economy-wide deadweight loss from
taxation. And this is what constrains the amount of redistribution in the economy.
C.E.S preferences for  (·) and  (·) form the bases of our analysis below:8
 ( ) =
( 1−
1− +
1−
1− ,   0  6= 1
ln + ln if  = 1 (3)
In Appendix A, we provide solutions for work  (   ) and leisure  (   ). Our solutions
establish  (   ) (and  (   )) are linear in  and in  , and increasing in  Further,
 (   )  0 if
¡
1 + ¢   (1− )− 1  (4)
For these functional forms,  is computed as a fixed point of
 = 
Z ¯
(1−)− 1−1
(1− ) 1 (1 + )− h
(1− ) + (1− ) 1
iG ()  (5)
Evidently, a closed form for the fixed point for  , while desirable, is not obtainable from
(5). To get at a closed form, suppose (4) holds for all  implying every agent’s labor supply
8By Bergson’s theorem (Katzner, 1970), these represent the entire class of additively-separable, homo-
thetic preferences.
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is interior for given  and  . In that case, and only then, the tax base (the average labor
supply, L) equals the labor supply of the average time-endowment agent, ¯. Hence, assuming
(4), (5) can be replaced by  =  ¯ where ¯ ≡  (¯   ) = (1+¯)−(1−)− 1 
1+(1−)1− 1
 ; from this, we obtain
the closed form,  =
h
 (1 + ¯) (1− ) 1
i

h
(1− ) 1 + 1
i

Based on this solution, (4) reduces to (1 + ) ≥ 
(1−) 1+1 (1 + ¯). And, in particular,
since  (and ) are linear and increasing in , setting  =  (the minimum of the support
of ) allows us to define a range of “permissible” tax rates for which the labor supply of each
agent is positive, based on the inequality
¡
1 + ¢ ≥ 
(1− ) 1 + 1 (1 + ¯)  (6)
From (6), it is easy to establish there exists a unique  ∗ ≡  ∗ () ∈ (0 1) such that
¡
1 + ¢ T 
(1− ) 1 + 1 (1 + ¯) for  T 
∗ (7)
The set of permissible tax rates, the range for which all agents choose an interior labor supply
is then [0  ∗)  In this range, the tax base (the average labor supply) equals the labor supply
of the average time-endowment agent, and erstwhile derived closed-form expressions for , 
and  (presented in Appendix A) are valid.
2.2 Diagrammatic intuition
To facilitate a clear understanding of the underlying economic intuition for a given tax/transfer
scheme, consider Figure 1a which captures a canonical configuration.9 In the figure, the
9As noted, the discussion here takes as given the tax-transfer policy which ultimately is determined in a
voting process described below. Additionally, Figures 1a-d show the agent obtains higher utility post policy.
Of course, this need not be the case, and certainly won’t be for all agents in the post policy world.
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agent’s budget line without redistribution (with slope -1) is shown as the segment 0
Faced with zero tax, the agent chooses point  and consumes  With the tax-transfer
program, the eﬀective budget line, 00, is flatter (with slope − (1− )) and has a kink
at 0 (The budget line with (without) redistribution is in red (black)). Why? While we
can envision the budget line 0 to extend to 00 any point on the segment 000 is not
attainable since the agent is constrained by the fact that even with the transfer she cannot
enjoy more leisure than the entirety of her time endowment, 1+ (Note, the way Figure 1a
is drawn, the point  lies below point  signifying that her potential maximum consump-
tion/income is lower post policy. This may not always be the case, as shown in Figures 1b
and 1d.)
Figure 1a:  lies above ; more leisure, less income post policy
9
Faced with the tax and transfer, her optimal choice is at  where she consumes  =
 + Pre policy, she consumed  =  ++, all of which she financed by the
sweat of her own labor. In the configuration of Figure 1a, post policy she consumes less: 
  Also, the income from her own labor supply has fallen from  to  (− )
since the  part is funded via the transfer.  +  is the labor income she eschews
because of the policy. In eﬀect then, the policy permits her to swap  + of income —
fruits of her own labor — for  units of “labor-free” transfer income and 00 additional
units of leisure. Two points are worthy of note here. First, even a one-for-one swap of own
labor income with transfer income, were it possible, would not be utility-neutral; such a
swap would raise utility because it increases leisure.10 Second, the agent may be willing to
accept a less than one-for-one swap ( for ) only because the transfer income helps her
economize on her own labor, placing  on a higher indiﬀerence curve than is  It is this
insight — explored further in Section 3.2 — that is key to understanding the results to follow.
What other sort of post-tax outcomes may emerge from our setup? Figure 1b illustrates
a possibility similar to that of Figure 1a but where point  lies above point  signifying
that her potential maximum consumption/income is higher post policy, yet surprisingly, she
emerges with less income post policy. In this case, her pre policy budget line lies everywhere
inside the post policy budget line. Figures 1c and d illustrate the more conventional settings
in which the agent ends up with higher income post policy.
10Unless the transfer is large enough, she cannot reach  at which point, the swap of own labor income
with transfer income is exactly one-to-one. As we will see below, the size of the transfer is contingent on the
level of inequality in the economy.
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Figure 1b:  lies above 
Figure 1c:  above B; more income post policy Figure 1d:  below B; more income post policy
2.3 Voting over redistributive policies
The redistributive policy is voted upon by every agent. As is standard in the median-voter
model, assume candidates care only about prevailing in the election and choose electoral
11
platforms to achieve this purpose. They also precommit to implementing the elected redis-
tribution policy if they win. Agent  is assumed to vote for that candidate whose electoral
platform  is closest to her own most-preferred, denoted   As in Meltzer and Richard,
agents understand the tax rate aﬀects the tax base, L and the transfer  ; they take these
into consideration when computing  
In general, the indirect utility of agent  is given by
  () ≡  ¡(1− )  ¡   ¢+ ¢+  (1 +  −  ¡   ¢) (8)
where  =  R  (   ) G (). Agent ’s most-preferred tax rate is given by   ()  = 0.
Using the envelope theorem, it is easily checked that 
()
 =  ()
£ 
 −  (   )
¤
implying
agent ’s most-preferred tax rate,  , when interior, solves  =  (   )  [As an aside, note
this implies   0 or that the economy is on the upward-sloping portion of the tax-revenue
Laﬀer curve]. When every agent’s labor supply is interior,   is implicitly determined from
  =  (
    )− R  (    ) G ()R 2 (    ) G () +  (    ) R 3 (    ) G () , (9)
where   =   R  (    ) G () is the transfer evaluated at  , and  () refers to the partial
derivative of  () with respect to its  th argument.
The numerator of (9) can be rewritten as 1  (  (    )−  ) ; since the denominator
of (9) is negative, an agent only votes for a positive tax rate if the transfer net of labor
income,   −   (    ), is positive. Agents with  (    ) ≥ L are constrained to vote
for a zero tax. When preferences for leisure and consumption are homothetic (as in (3))
and each agent’s labor supply is positive, average labor supply (L) coincides with the labor
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supply of the agent with average time endowment,  (¯    )  Then, (9) can be rewritten as
  =  (
    )−  (¯    )R 2 (    ) G () +  (    ) R 3 (   ) G ()  (10)
It follows, the average time-endowment agent (and those richer) vote for a zero tax, and the
median eﬀective-time agent votes for a positive tax.
Following Meltzer and Richard (1981), if   is monotonically declining in  the median
voter theorem identifies the Condorcet winner (a.k.a., the elected tax rate or the equilibrium
tax rate) as the tax rate most preferred by the agent with the median time endowment (i.e.,
the  most favored by the agent with  =  henceforth ). Replacing  with  in (11)
yields the implicit expression for .
Using (3) and (10), the most-preferred tax of agent  satisfies
  ¡1−  ¢ 1 +   ¡1−  ¢ = µ1− (1 + )
(1 + ¯)
¶¡
1−  ¢ ³1 + ¡1−  ¢ 1´2  (11)
A derivation of (11) is contained in Appendix B. Replacing  with  in (11) yields the
implicit expression for the equilibrium tax rate, . It bears emphasis here that (11) yields
closed-form solutions only for selected integer values of 
Our expression (11) presupposes  ( )  0 for all , and hence, is only valid if the fixed
point of (11), evaluated at  = , lies in the interval [0  ∗). It turns out a condition similar
to (6) ensures this is true.
Lemma 1 If
¡
1 + ¢ ≥ 
(1 + ) (1 + ¯) (12)
holds, then the elected tax,  derived from (11), lies in the range of permissible tax rates,
i.e., it satisfies 0     ∗ where  ∗ is defined in (7).
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The proof is in Appendix C. Of course, (12) is a condition suﬃcient to ensure    ∗;
the elected tax rate may still satisfy this inequality even if (12) is violated.11’12 Heuristically,
the size of the transfer depends critically on ¯ (the mean endowment). If this transfer is
large relative to the time endowment of the lowest-endowed agent, that agent will choose
not to work. Condition (12) puts a limit on how large the transfer can be and yet leave every
agent with interior labor supply. Only then will  be consistent with the tax choice of the
median voter.
Summarizing, if (12) holds, the elected tax rate lies in the permissible range [0  ∗) for
which every agent chooses interior levels of labor supply. This means, if (12) holds, then
at the elected tax rate, the average labor supply equals the labor supply of the average
time-endowment agent; additionally, the closed-form expressions for ,  and  derived in
the appendix are valid, and all such variables are interior at the elected tax rate.
2.4 Discussion
It bears emphasis the median voter’s choice of the tax rate is one that maximizes her utility.
What does such a tax rate imply about her income? Below, we establish that the median
voter chooses a tax rate that does not maximize her income.
11This point is illustrated in our numerical example below.
12A condition such as (12) may easily be rewritten in terms of the parameters of the underlying distribution.
For example, suppose  is distributed according to a bounded Pareto distribution over support £ ¤ with
PDF given by  ¡¢ ¡¢−−1 (1− ()). Then (12) becomes
¡
1 + ¢ ≥ 
(1 + )
⎛
⎝1 +
¡¢
1−
³ 

´ µ − 1
¶Ã
1¡¢−1 − 1¡¢−1
!⎞
⎠ 
written solely in terms of the underlying distributional parameters.
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Proposition 1

 |  0
Locally near  her income is declining in the tax rate; the implication is  does not
maximize her income.13 Intuitively, it is clear this derivative can never be positive since that
would imply she could raise her consumption and leisure by choosing a higher tax.
At some level, this is somewhat to be expected; after all, anything that maximizes utility
may not maximize one of its components. Nevertheless, three points deserve mention here.
First, note Proposition 1 does not address what happens to median income globally, away
from  Second, the result has nothing to oﬀer on the comparison between median voter’s
income pre and post policy. And third, perhaps most importantly, while the proposition
argues the median voter does not maximize her income, it does not oﬀer any insight into
why she may choose a tax rate which leaves her with less income post policy.
Whether a voter’s income post redistribution is less than her income pre redistribution
depends on the global properties of her post redistribution income,  = (1− )  (  )+
 =  (  )−  [ (  )−  (¯  )] versus  =  ( 0 0)  It is easily seen

 |=0 =
∙ (   )
 +
 (   )



¸
=0| {z }
0
− ¡ ¡ 0 0¢−  (¯ 0 0)¢
The first term (the underscored term) is negative, and captures the deadweight loss of
distortionary taxation. The second term is the change in the net transfer brought on by the
marginal change in the tax. If the median and mean endowment were to coincide,  = 0; in
13We thank an anonymous referee and Torben M. Andersen for alerting us to this result. The proof follows
straightforwardly from the first order conditions to the agent’s problem, and from noting that  satisfies

 −  (   ) = 0
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that case,  |==0  0 for  = ¯ and any marginal change in the tax always hurts the
median voter. At the other end of the spectrum though, those with  far less than ¯ will see
a marginal increase in their net transfer which may exceed the deadweight loss. Such agents
may benefit income-wise. Outside of these limiting cases, the issue of whether redistribution
raises or lowers overall income, is quite up in the air. This constitutes the analytical leverage
of this study, and this is what we turn to next.
3 Post-redistribution income and inequality
The income of agent  in the absence of policy is denoted by 0 ≡  ( 0 0)  For an arbitrary
 ∈ [0  ∗)  the post tax-transfer income of agent  is given by  ≡ (1− )  (   ) + 
where  =  ¯. Define  () ≡ 0 −   as the income gap, pre and post redistribution. If
 ()  0 agent  is worse oﬀ in income terms post tax/transfer. Clearly,  (0) = 0 Under
(3), for  ∈ [0  ∗)  we can compute
 () = 1 + 

2
−
⎡
⎣(1 + ¯)(1− )
1

(1 + (1− ) 1 ) +
(1− )1+ 1
³
(1 + )
³
1 + (1− ) 1
´
− (1 + ¯)
´
(1 + (1− ) 1 )
³
(1− ) + (1− ) 1
´
⎤
⎦ 
(13)
Of primary concern, however, is  () evaluated at the elected tax rate, . In other
words, can   0 or  ()  0 for some ? for all ? 14As noted above, a closed-form
14Condition (13) may be rewritten in terms of the parameters of the underlying distribution. To see this,
rewrite (13) as
 ()  0⇔ ¡1 + ¢  
(1 + ¯)(1− ) 1
Ã
(1−) 1
(1+(1−) 1 )

(1−)+(1−) 1

!
µ
1
2 − (1−
)1+
1
(1−)+(1−) 1
¶ 
Obviously, for given   depends on  and ¯ which, in turn, are purely functions of underlying distrib-
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solution for  is available only for a few integer values for  So, a direct verification of
 ( = )  0 for a generic  is not possible. As such, we adopt the strategy of establishing
 () ≥ 0 (for all permissible   which, of course includes ) but for a specific range of
15
3.1 Poorer income-wise
Since we cannot, at this level of generality, establish the shape of  ()  we present various
illustrative configurations in Figure 2a-c. A road map of our strategy which makes use of
these figures is provided below.
Assuming each agent’s labor supply is interior (which it will be, whenever (12) holds), we
write down a suﬃcient condition in Lemma 2 which ensures  ( = 0)  0, thereby ruling
out the possibility illustrated in Figure 2a. Note if  =  it is still possible  ()  0
in Figure 2a, but since we are unable to rule out  =   we must preclude this path for
 ().
There still remains the possibility that  (0)  0, but  () eventually decreases and
becomes negative. Further, it could be that  ()  0 (as shown now at  =  ), but
of course we cannot rule out  ()  0 (as would be the case at  =  ). See Figure
utional parameters. As such, all terms on the right hand side of the above expression are, in principle, all
functions of underlying distributional parameters.
15More generally though, if we could show D ()  0 for the admissible range of  and for all  we’d
have shown that, irrespective of the tax elected, each  will be worse oﬀ post-redistribution. But this is not
possible for all values of ; after all,
lim→∞D
 () = 1
2

 − 2
¡¯− ¢  0 ∀  ¯
This means, if  is suﬃciently high, the income gap is negative at any arbitrary tax rate, implying, for high
enough  everyone with   ¯ is better oﬀ with redistribution. In other words, immiserizing redistribution
is unlikely to be a feature of high- economies.
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2b. There is no simple way to preclude this configuration for general  As such, we proceed
to establish  ()  0 for a specific   = 3 This is done in Proposition 2. Once this
is established, we proceed to show  ()   0 for all  in the relevant range. Lemma
3 shows this and hence serves to expand the range of  for which  ()  0 holds (as
illustrated in Figure 2c).
Figure 2a: A configuration of  () Figure 2b: A configuration of  ()
Figure 2c: A configuration of  ()
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Lemma 2 (i)  () is a continuously diﬀerentiable function of both  and .
(ii)  ()  0 locally around  = 0 if
1 +   
(1 + ) (1 + ¯)  (14)
Note the similarity between (14) and (12). In particular, if (12) holds so does (14), but
since (12) is not necessary for interior labor supply throughout, we assume the weaker (14)
here. This condition is suﬃcient to ensure agent  will not cease to work after the tax is
imposed but is necessary to ensure  (0)  0 We are now ready to verify  ()  0 holds
for  ∈ [0  ∗) for a specific value of 
Proposition 2 Suppose  = 3 and (14) holds for  = 3. Then,  ()  0 for all  ∈ [0 ∗).
The proof is in Appendix D.
Lemma 3  () is decreasing in  for any  ∈ (0 1).
It follows from Property (i) of Lemma 2, Proposition 2 and Lemma 3 that for  satisfying
(14),  ()  0 ∀ 0   ≤ 3 and  ∈ [0  ∗) 16 The thrust of Proposition (2) is established
in the two corollaries below, our flagship results.
Corollary 1 Suppose  satisfies (14) and    ∗ holds. Then,  ()  0, ∀ 0   ≤ 3
That is, for  in the range (0 3]  the income the median voter receives with redistribution is
lower than what she receives in the absence of redistribution.17
16When  = 3 D () is a relatively-simple polynomial and it is easy to show the result. The fact it holds
for  = 3 and by the proposition, for any 0    3, we have covered a large swath of the values of 
that are consistent with empirical estimates of this parameter. Of course, it is possible D ()  0 holds for
 ∈ [0 ∗) for values of   3 The numerical examples below — see Appendix F — testify to this possibility.
17Note that if conditon (12) holds, we are assured (14) and   ∗ holds. However, since (12) is suﬃcient
but not necessary and may be unduly restrictive, we do not impose it.
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The irony in Corollary 1 is self evident. The median voter, in spite of being the decisive
voter, chooses to immiserize herself in income terms. If it is not the prospect of receiving
higher net income, what encourages the median voter to support such income redistribution?
The answer, almost by default, has to be leisure.18 Specifically, she raises her utility through
greater leisure by replacing labor income with labor-free transfer income. Ultimately, this
increase in her utility is bankrolled on net by those at the higher end of the distribution who
suﬀer utility declines as a result. The numerical example below will lay bare these trade-oﬀs.
Is the fate of the median voter shared by others?
Corollary 2 Suppose  satisfies (12). Then,  ()  0 ∀ 0   ≤ 3 That is, for  in
the range (0 3]  the post tax-transfer income of every voter is lower.
Of course, it bears emphasis here that the preconditions outlined in these corollaries are
merely suﬃcient.19
3.2 Numerics
Next, we present an example that a) illustrates the applicability of our results to a much
wider portion of the parameter space, and b) brings our analysis in some contact with the
data.20 To that end, assume preferences are as in (3). Let  be distributed according to a
18To see this, denote the leisure of agent  in the absence of policy by 0 ≡ 
¡ 0 0¢  The post tax-transfer
leisure of agent  under the elected tax policy is denoted by  ≡ 
¡  ¢  Since (18) establishes
labor supply is declining in the tax rate, and since the elected tax rate is positive,   0 must obtain.
19Corollary 1 presumes all agents choose an interior labor supply at the elected tax rate. The condition
laid out in (14) is not suﬃcent to rule out corner solutions for some agents. The condition in Corollary 2,
on the other hand, is suﬃcent to rule out corner solutions for everyone (see Lemma (1)).
20Obviously, our intention here is not to conduct a full-blown calibration exercise, but simply to illustrate
the wide scope of applicability of our contrarian result for the Meltzer-Richard model.
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lognormal distribution, i.e., ln  ∼ N ( ) where we set  = 021’22 We have numerically
verified that as  is increased from 0 to 1, the ratio of the eﬀective time endowment of the
mean to median agent, (1 + ¯) (1 + ) goes from 1 to 1.32 and fundamental inequality in
 (as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient) increases monotonically, roughly between 0 and 0.52.
Pre-tax income Ginis for most countries lie in the 0.25-0.5 range. The ratio of post-policy
mean to median income generated by the model runs from 1 to 1.22, roughly in line with
U.S. data. The parametric choices we consider, however, produce a social spending-to-GDP
ratio (captured here by ) in the range of (0-46%), which is larger than the range of OECD
estimates (2-12%) for the same.23 However, if government spending includes more items
than direct redistributive spending, our ratios would lie well within the observed range. We
plot various variables of interest as functions of  ∈ (0 1) for three diﬀerent values of 
21A few words about this choice are in order. First, while a fair bit is known about the pre-tax income
distribution in the U.S., say, not much is known about fundamental inequality, much less the fundamental
time-endowment distribution, underlying our results. Second, post tax/transfer income data for the entire
U.S. population is diﬃcult to come by. Much of what we know in this regard comes from I.R.S records, and
is largely restricted to information about the top decile. Third, it appears no standard distribution does
a great job of capturing the entire U.S. income distribution. As Piketty and Saez (2003) and others point
out, the Pareto distribution works best only for the top two deciles while much of the action in our paper
happens in the lower deciles. Cowell (2012) argues the lognormal distribution is a better fit for the bottom
80%, and hence we adopt it, somewhat uncritically, as our distribution of choice for 
22The lognormal density is given by
exp
n
− (ln − )2 22
o
√2  its mean by exp
¡+ 052¢  its median by
exp() and skewness by exp(2) + 2
µq
exp(2) + 1
¶

23Available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/statistics
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 = 080 099 and 150
Figure 3a:  and  against  (for  = 080 099 150)
Figure 3b: D () against  (for  = 080 099 150)
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Clearly, in Figure 3a, the elected tax rate and transfer rises with  and also with . As
shown in Figure 3b, the median agent earns more income pre tax/transfer:  ()  0
From Figure 3c, it is apparent that as inequality rises, the median voter’s own labor income,
(1− )  falls while transfer income,  rises, making the latter a larger fraction of the
agent’s total income, (1− )  +  However, as this figure shows, transfer income only
becomes the bulk of the median voter’s overall income when  is suﬃciently high, and that
too only for  = 150 (for  ' 093).
Figure 3c: Median own labor income and transfer income (for  = 080 099 15)
A key point made in Section 2.2 — the median voter is willing to accept a less than one-
for-one swap of labor income for labor-free transfer income — is illustrated in Figure 3d, for
the case  = 099 and  increasing from 0 to 1 Here, this trade-oﬀs in income — see Figure
1a and the surrounding discussion — is summarized by the ratio + , where, recall, 
is the amount of transfer income received, and  + the labor income given up, under
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redistribution. This ratio, for the median voter, is shown in the figure as the center plot of
the top three lines, starting at 065 when  = 0 and gradually rising as  increases. Figure
3d also shows the plight of the mean voter (the plot that is negatively sloped as  rises) and
that of the agent with the lowest endowment,  =  = 0. In the case of the latter, the ratio

+ hovers near 1 (and only exceeds 1 for   055) for the span for  we consider.
Figure 3d also shows the relative gains in leisure (000 ) for these three agents, where
0 is the amount of leisure the agent chooses sans redistribution and 00 is the additional
leisure the agent enjoys under the redistributive policy. These are shown in the bottom
three plots of Figure 3d. As evident, the gains to redistribution for all agents are measured
primarily in terms of greater leisure, and the relative gains are greatest for the poorest agents.
Figure 3d: Swapping own labor income for transfer income,  = 099
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We have verified — for  ∈ (0 1) and  = 080 and  = 099 — the fraction of agents that
is better oﬀ income-wise with policy is nearly zero (shown in Figure 3e as a horizontal line
tracing the X-axis). In this case, nearly everyone is hurt income-wise by the tax-transfer
policy.24
Figure 3e: Fraction of agents made better oﬀ income-wise with policy (for  = 080.99, 1.5)
24We should note our result that no one may emerge with greater income post-transfer is an artifact of
our assumption of the lower bound on the endowment , specifically, that  = 0. Suppose, for example, our
distribution permitted values for  less than 0, such as −1. In that case, some agents will emerge better
oﬀ, income-wise, with transfers, as long as there is some right-skewness in the distribution. Such agents will
have very little income and leisure to begin with (without redistribution), and so may well have more income
and leisure post-transfer. There will also be a set of agents within these low  agents that chose not to work
under redistribution.
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Figure 3f: Fraction of agents made better oﬀ income-wise with policy (for  = 2 3 4)
Figure 3e also depicts the same for  = 150; in this case, no more than 15% of the population
is better oﬀ income-wise with the redistribution policy. For higher, possibly less empirically-
relevant values of , a greater portion of the population is made better oﬀ income-wise as
 rises — see Figure 3f; yet, it may never exceed 50% of the electorate.25 These examples,
and many others we have generated but not reported, bolsters the claim that our result –
the median voter (and many poorer voters) suﬀer income losses with redistribution – is
widespread in the Meltzer-Richard model.
It bears emphasis here that our results arise fromwithin a voting equilibrium, one in which
the median voter chooses her income. As is clear, textbook substitution and income eﬀects
are present but here they are far more involved than usual because the agent internalizes
25Figure 3f utilizes a smaller spread in  in order to ensure labor supply decisions are consistent with
interior solutions, an assumption we have utilized throughout our analysis.
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these eﬀects in her choice of the tax rate. Additionally, her choice unleashes an economy-wide
wealth eﬀect due to the transfer, whose size in turn, is ultimately in her hands.
Despite the fact that redistribution results in less income for the median voter and others,
it does achieve what it sets out to do — namely, reduce the amount of income inequality — as
the following proposition attests.
Proposition 3 Redistribution reduces income inequality.
In the absence of redistributive policies, the income gap between any two agents  ,
is simply, ( − ) 2. With redistribution,  −  ≡ (1− ) ( (   )−  (   )) =
(1−)(1−) 1 (−)
(1−)+(1−) 1
  But (1−)(1−) 1
(1−)+(1−) 1
  1
2
 i.e., 2 (1− ) (1− ) 1  (1− ) + (1− ) 1  since
(1− ) + (1− ) 1 − 2 (1− ) (1− ) 1 = (1− ) (1− (1− ) 1 ) + (1− ) 1   0.
Redistribution always reduces the income gap between agents; i.e., 0 − 0   −  for
any  , with   . At its core, then, income redistribution in the Meltzer-Richard model
isn’t necessarily about allowing some to receive more income than they would in its absence;
it is about evening out disparities in income.
4 Concluding remarks
Much of the literature on income distribution in democratic environments takes oﬀ from
Meltzer and Richard (1981). The Meltzer-Richard model analyzes a very simple redistrib-
utive scheme. The tax instrument is a proportional income tax in an economy where het-
erogeneous agents have diﬀerent innate productivities (and hence, income), and choose to
work diﬀerent amounts. The tax revenue is redistributed lump sum to everyone. In such an
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environment, if the median voter has lower pre-tax income than the average voter, Meltzer
and Richard showed that the former would favor governments that implement a positive tax
rate, one which brings her a positive net transfer. We ask, how does her post-tax income
compare to her pre-tax income? Somewhat curiously, we find that the median voter (and
many poorer voters) may end up with a lower post-tax income. If it is not the prospect
of receiving higher income, what drives the median voter to support such income redistri-
bution? The answer, quite simply, is leisure. A higher tax reduces the incentive to supply
labor, reduces labor income and, as we have seen, potentially reduces post-redistribution
income; the only saving grace is additional leisure time financed by the income transfer. In
sum, while the Meltzer-Richard model has a clear message explaining the strong support for
income redistributive policies in high before-tax income inequality environments, the basis
for that support is often leisure, not income. At least within the narrow confines of the
Meltzer-Richard environment, — static, single good, linear taxation, and lump-sum, untar-
geted redistribution — democracy is well-suited for evening out inequality, but not necessarily
for lifting incomes of the poor.
Two final remarks are in order here. First, while to the best of our knowledge, no one has
actually suggested that redistribution must result in higher income for agents at or below
the median, it seemed self-evident to us (and possibly others) until we found otherwise.
Second, our result has some bearing on the literature on transfer paradoxes in international
economics. There, a transfer from one country to another, by mangling the terms of trade,
can immiserize the recipient and enrich the donor. In such models though, the recipient
does not choose to get the transfer; it is simply thrust upon the recipient. By contrast,
in the Meltzer-Richard model, the recipient median voter chooses the transfer herself, but
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paradoxically, redistribution leaves her with less not more income.
In future work, it may be interesting to explore if and how the sorts of concerns raised
in this paper may have implications for why democracies on two sides of the Atlantic seem
so far apart when it comes to taxes, leisure, and income redistribution.
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Appendix
A C.E.S. preferences
Let
 ( ) =
( 1−
1− +
1−
1− ,   0  6= 1
ln + ln if  = 1 
For these preferences, an interior solution for work is
 ¡   ¢ = (1− ) 1 (1 + )− h
(1− ) + (1− ) 1
i (15)
Clearly,  (   ) ≥ 0 if (4) holds. Assuming (4) holds for all agents, the tax base L ≡R  (   ) G () is ¯ = (1+¯)−(1−)− 1 
1+(1−)1− 1
  where ¯ is obtained from (15) by evaluating  at
the mean ¯ Since  = L, we can solve for  and ¯ in terms of the tax rate only,  =h
 (1 + ¯) (1− ) 1
i

h
(1− ) 1 + 1
i
and ¯ =
h
(1 + ¯) (1− ) 1
i

h
(1− ) 1 + 1
i
 The labor
and leisure choices for agent  assuming (4) are then given by
 ¡ ¢ = (1− ) 1 (1 + )
³
(1− ) 1 + 1
´
−  (1 + ¯)³
(1− ) 1 + 1
´³
(1− ) 1 + (1− )
´ (16)
and
 ¡ ¢ = 
³
(1− ) 1 + (1− )
´
+ (¯− )  (1− ) 1 +
³
(1− ) 1 + (1− )
´
³
(1− ) 1 + 1
´³
(1− ) 1 + (1− )
´  (17)
For future use, note that
 ( )
 = −
1

(1− ) 1−1 [(1 + ) (1− ) +  ]h
(1− ) 1 + (1− )
i2  0 (18)
Using the solution for  above, (4) reduces to (1 + ) ≥ 
(1−) 1+1 (1 + ¯). Since  (and )
are linear and increasing in , setting  =  (the minimum of the support of ) allows us to
define a range of “permissible” tax rates for which the labor supply of each agent is positive:
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¡
1 + ¢ ≥ 
(1−) 1+1 (1 + ¯)  The right-hand side of this inequality is strictly increasing in  
equal to 0 when  = 0 and is (1 + ¯) when  = 1 Therefore, there exists a unique  ∗ ∈ (0 1)
such that¡
1 + ¢ T 
(1− ) 1 + 1 (1 + ¯) for  T 
∗
It follows that when  ∈ [0  ∗)  everyone chooses an interior labor supply and in this
range, the tax base (the average labor supply) equals the labor supply of the average time-
endowment agent.
B Proof of (11)
Using (10) and (16), it follows that
 =
(1+)− (¯+1)(1−)
− 1
1+(1−)− 1
1+(1−)1− 1
− 1+¯
1+(1−)− 1
− (1+¯)


(1−) 1 (−1)+1
2
(1−) 2

(1−) 1 (1−)+ 
1+(1−)− 1

1
(1−)1− 1
+

−(1−) 1 (
1+)

(1−) 1 +1

−(1+¯)

(1−) 1 +1

(1−) 1 +(1−)
 (1−)
− 1
1+(1−)1− 1

(19)
The numerator reduces to 1
1+(1−)1− 1 ((1 + )− (1 + ¯)) and the denominator to
− (1 + ¯)

³
1 + (1− )1− 1
´2
(1− ) 2
⎛
⎝
1 + (1− )1− 1 −  (1− )
³
1 + (1− )− 1
´
³
1 + (1− )− 1
´
(1− )1− 1
⎞
⎠− (1− )
− 1 (1 + )³
1 + (1− )1− 1
´2
Then, (19) reduces to
−  (1 + ¯)

³
1 + (1− )1− 1
´2
(1− ) 2
⎛
⎝
1 + (1− )1− 1 −  (1− )
³
1 + (1− )− 1
´
³
1 + (1− )− 1
´
(1− )1− 1
⎞
⎠+ (1 + ¯)
1 + (1− )1− 1
=
1
1 + (1− )1− 1
¡
1 + ¢+  (1− )− 1³
1 + (1− )1− 1
´2 ¡1 + ¢ (20)
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Furthermore, the right hand side of (20) simplifies to

1+(1−)− 1

(1+)

1+(1−)1− 1
2 and the left hand side
to
= − 1

³
(1− ) 1 (−1) + 1
´2 1 + ¯
(1− ) 1 (+2)
µ
1
(1−) 1 + 1
¶ ×
h
( − ) (1− ) +  (1− ) 2 (1− ) + (1− ) 1 (2 −  − 2)
i
So the equation which determines   is rewritten as

³
1 +
¡
1−  ¢− 1´Ã¡1−  ¢+2 Ã 1
(1−  ) 1 + 1
!!
(1 + )
(1 + ¯)
=
¡ −  ¢ ¡1−  ¢+  ¡1−  ¢ 2 ¡1−  ¢+ ¡1−  ¢ 1 ¡2 −   − 2 ¢
Routine rearrangement yields

³
1 +
¡
1−  ¢ 1´2 ¡1−  ¢ (1 + )
(1 + ¯) =
¡ −  ¢ ¡1−  ¢+  ¡1−  ¢1+ 2 + ¡1−  ¢ 1 ¡2 −   − 2
⇔   ¡1−  ¢ 1 +   ¡1−  ¢ = µ1− (1 + )
(1 + ¯)
¶¡
1−  ¢ h1 + ¡1−  ¢ 2 + 2 ¡1−  ¢ 1 i
⇔   ¡1−  ¢ 1 +   ¡1−  ¢ = µ1− (1 + )
(1 + ¯)
¶¡
1−  ¢ ³1 + ¡1−  ¢ 1´2
which is (11). ¥
C Proof of Lemma 1
Let  () ≡ 
(1+) − (1−) 1+1  It is easy to show 0 ()  0 and that  (0) =

(1+) and
 (1) = − 1
(1+)  Since  () is continuous over [0 1], there exists a value  0 such that  ()  0
for    0 and  () ≤ 0 for  ≥  0 It follows that if the elected tax,  ≤  0 for all 
then any lower bound that satisfies
¡
1 + ¢ ≥ (1+¯)
(1+) →
¡
1 + ¢  (1+¯)
(1−) 1+1  Further, since,
by definition,
¡
1 + ¢ = ∗
(1−∗) 1+1 (1 + ¯), we can conclude the lower bound agent is not at
a corner.
We can characterize the tax rate  0 as a fixed point of the following equation:
 = 
1 + 
³
1 + (1− ) 1
´
(21)
Characterizing the elected tax rate is more diﬃcult. However, from the first-order con-
dition for the tax rate, 
()
 =  ()
£ 
 −  (   )
¤  the elected tax rate will be less
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than the tax rate that maximizes the transfer as long as  (   )  0 . The transfer is
 = (1+¯)(1−) 1
(1−) 1+1  Diﬀerentiating  , the tax rate that maximizes the transfer satisfies:
 = 
1 +  +  (1− ) 1
³
1 + (1− ) 1
´
 (22)
Since the right-hand side of (22) is everywhere below that of the right-hand side of (21),
the elected tax rate must be below  0 Hence, if the condition ¡1 + ¢ ≥ (1+¯)(1+) is met,¡
1 + ¢  (1+¯)
(1−) 1+1 will hold as well. ¥
D Proof of Proposition 2
Proof for the same for  = 3 The expression  () is increasing in  Let  = 3 In this
case,
lim
→ 3¯−1
1+3
 () =
(1 + ¯)
h
2 (1− ) 13
³
1− (1− ) 13
´
+
³
3 (1− )− 3 (1− ) 23 +  (1− ) 13
´i
8
³
1 + (1− ) 13
´³
(1− ) + (1− ) 13
´ 
The sign of the denominator is positive for  ∈ (0 1)  The first expression in the square
brackets in the numerator, 2 (1− ) 13
³
1− (1− ) 13
´
≥ 0 for  ∈ [0 1]  The second term,
3 (1− )− 3 (1− ) 23 +  (1− ) 13 is also positive for all  ∈ [0 1]  To see this latter point,
let  ≡ (1− ) 13  so  = 1 − 3 We can then rewrite 3 (1− ) − 3 (1− ) 23 +  (1− ) 13
as  (32 − 3 + 1− 3) ≡  ()  Note that  (0) = 0 To determine the sign of  () for
 ∈ (0 1]  it is suﬃcient to determine the sign of 32−3+1−3 Note that (32−3+1−3) =
−3 ( − 1)2  0 so (32 − 3 + 1− 3) is smallest at  = 1 At  = 1 32− 3+1− 3 = 0
It follows that for 0    1  ()  0 Hence,  ()  0 for all  ∈ (0 1) 
Notice, the right-hand side of the inequality  ≥ ¯−1
1+ is increasing in . Therefore, if
 ≥ 3¯−1
1+3
, the inequality  ≥ ¯−1
1+ is satisfied for all values of   3 It then follows from
that  () ≥ 0 for all  ∈ [0 1] for 0 ≤  ≤ 3 ¥
E Proof of Lemma 3
We have 0 ≡  ( 0 0)   ≡ (1− )  (   ) +  and  () ≡ 0 −   The easiest way
to show Lemma 3 is to show how  () changes for a change in  for a given transfer  ,
and then show how  aﬀects  and ultimately  () 
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From (15), we have 0 = 1+2  and  = (1− ) (1−)
1 (1+)−
(1−)+(1−) 1
+ Such that  (  ) =

 = 
µ
(1−)(1−)1+ 1 (1+)
(1−)+(1−) 1
¶
− (1−) 1
(1−)+(1−) 1

  For a given transfer  then, the change in
0 −  resulting from a marginal change in  is
(1− ) ln (1− )
2
(1− ) 1 ((1− ) (1 + ) + )³
(1− ) 1 + (1− )
´2  0
since ln (1− )  0 for any 1−   1
Next, note that the diﬀerence 0 −  is decreasing in  : (

0−)
 = − (1−)
1
(1−) 1+(1−)  0
Finally, since  = 
h
(1 + ¯) (1− ) 1
i

h
(1− ) 1 + 1
i
  = − ln(1−)2 (1−)
1 (1+¯)
(1−) 1+1
2  0 It
follows that  () is decreasing in  ¥
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